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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists have always shown a desire for insights into the policy 
formation of government agencies. The Federal Reserve, in particular, 
has been under intense scrutiny since its inception, not only because of 
its powerful short-run effect on total demand and income determination, 
but also because its decisions are made in closed meetings with little 
explicit Congressional guidance. 
The lack of specific Congressional directives toward Federal Reserve 
policy is expressed in the Employment Act of 1946. This legislation 
suggests the broad goals of monetary policy (high employment, stable 
prices, and economic growth), but it contains no statement of priorities 
within this group of economic goals. Consequently, the Fed must indepen­
dently establish the priorities when a situation arises where it is 
impossible to satisfy all goals simultaneously. 
Federal Reserve independence was further established by the Federal 
Reserve-Treasury Accord of 1951. The Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord 
freed the Federal Reserve from its subservient relationship with the 
Treasury. In the ten years prior to the Accord, the Federal Reserve was 
responsible for the stability of the bond markets due to heavy and 
frequent borrowing by the Treasury for the war effort. The Fed was 
considered to be "pegging the interest rate" during this period. 
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In the 1970s, legislation^ that attempted to give Congress more 
input into the development of monetary policy has been harshly criticized 
by Milton Friedman. Friedman is disappointed with the results of this 
legislation because he believes it has been ineffective in reducing the 
discretionary powers of the Fed [15, pp. 107-109]. 
It is, therefore, generally accepted that the Federal Reserve has 
short-run discretionary powers. If Federal Reserve decision making is 
independent of the elected branches of government, what are the Fed's 
objectives of monetary policy? This question alone creates incentive for 
researchers to attempt to quantify the reaction of Federal Reserve policy 
to economic conditions. But, there are more important reasons to study 
Federal Reserve policy objectives besides mere curiosity. 
One reason often cited is that most econometric models of the 
macroeconomy assume exogenous Federal Reserve behavior. But, if the 
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Federal Reserve reacts systematically to current economic conditions, 
then monetary policy should be endogenous to the model. If Federal 
Reserve behavior is assumed to be exogenous when in fact it is 
endogenous, then econometric models with exogenous monetary policy are 
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misspecified and policy multipliers will be biased. 
^This reference is to House Concurrent Resolution 133 (1975), the 
Federal Reserve Reform Act (1977), and the Full Employment and Balanced 
Growth Act (Humphrey-Hawkins Act) (1978). 
^"If, however, stabilization policy is endogenous but reacts only to 
lagged quarterly values of the target variables, this bias will not 
exist" [16, p. 176]. 
^For a more complete discussion of this source of bias in 
multipliers, see Goldfeld and Blinder [19]. 
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A more recent incentive to study Federal Reserve policy formation 
stems from the rational expectations literature. If Federal Reserve 
policy reacts systematically to economic conditions, then rational 
economic agents will incorporate this information into their decision 
making, which will in turn affect the impact of policy on the economy.^ 
A related concept deals with the expectations of policy formation when 
separate policy makers are attempting to influence the same macroeconomic 
variables. Suppose both the Federal Reserve and Congress are attempting 
to affect national income. If Congress has no knowledge (or imperfect 
knowledge) of the Fed's policy intentions. Congress will select a 
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suboptimal fiscal policy. Therefore, Congress has incentive to predict 
Federal Reserve reactions to the state of the economy when developing 
fiscal policy. 
Federal Reserve policy formation has also been studied with the 
intent of discovering whether the Fed is influenced by the political 
election cycle. It would clearly be unethical for the central bank to 
manipulate the macroeconomy for partisan political objectives. 
There is one additional reason to study Federal Reserve policy 
creation. The last 15 years have seen intense argument over what should 
be the proper operating strategy of the Fed. As a result, the Fed has 
moved away from a money market strategy and toward a monetary aggregate 
strategy. In addition, bouts with inflation have pressed the Fed toward 
^For a discussion of the role of expectations in macroeconomic 
models, see Swamy, Barth, and Tinsley [43]. 
^For a theoretical explanation, see Adam [2]. 
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targeting monetary aggregates. Specifically, in early 1970 and again in 
October 1979 the Federal Reserve has announced that it is targeting 
monetary aggregates. This change in strategy may affect how the Fed 
reacts to the state of economy. 
For all of the aforementioned reasons, economists have estimated 
Federal Reserve reaction functions of the following general form: 
P = f ( w , x , y , z )  ( 1 . 1 )  
where P is the policy instrument (or indicator of policy intent) assumed 
to be entirely controlled by the Fed; and w, x, y, and z are the ultimate 
macroeconomic goal variables (or intermediate targets) to which the Fed 
is hypothesized to react. Federal Reserve policy has often been assumed 
to be reflected by monetary aggregates, various forms of the monetary 
base, types of reserves, open market interest rates, or the federal funds 
rate. The macroeconomic goals to which the Fed is supposed to react are 
usually specified as growth in output, inflation, unemployment, and the 
balances of payments, or proxies and variations of these. The estimation 
of a reaction function such as this will generate coefficients that may 
shed light on the weights the Fed attaches to the objectives of monetary 
policy. 
Many previous studies of the objectives of monetary policy have 
three inherent weaknesses. Two of those weaknesses occur in the 
specification of the policy indicator, while the third relates to the 
specification of the goal variables. 
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First, most studies assume the Fed is operating under a money market 
strategy or a monetary aggregate strategy. However, if a money market 
policy indicator is used while the Fed is actually targeting monetary 
aggregates, then the coefficients generated will have little meaning. 
This is also true if the situation is reversed. Also, over time, the Fed 
may switch strategies, which would make either specification of strategy 
incorrect. 
Second, for reliable reaction function coefficients to be generated, 
the Fed must have total control over the policy instrument. That is, 
there can be no difference between actual and intended policy. 
Researchers testing political business cycle hypotheses have shown that 
unexpected federal deficits may cause the Fed to passively monetize the 
debt if they are operating under a money market strategy [27, p. 66]. 
Alternatively, these deficits may cause interest rates to rise if the Fed 
is pursuing a monetary aggregate strategy. In either case, intended 
policy may deviate from actual policy (as measured by monetary aggregates 
or open market interest rates) due to the federal budget deficit. 
Third, many studies attempting to discover the objectives of 
monetary policy by observing how the Fed reacted to macroeconomic 
conditions use macroeconomic data that is concurrent with the policy 
decision. Researchers using concurrent macroeconomic data implicitly 
assume the Fed has perfect foresight. Alternatively, researchers using 
lagged or autoregressively formed data may have underestimated the 
forecasting abilities of the Fed. In either case, these studies fail to 
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allow the Fed to react to economic information it may have known when it 
made a policy decision. 
In this paper, I will develop a Federal Reserve reaction function 
while avoiding the three weaknesses just described. I will use a 
dichotomous policy instrument variable of "easy money" and "tight money" 
created from an evaluation of the Record of Policy Actions of the Federal 
Open Market Committee. This will avoid the two monetary indicator 
problems, previously discussed, altogether. In addition, I will use 
forecasts of macroeconomic data generated from an unrestricted vector 
autoregression (VAR) model. This method of data generation will be 
explained further in Chapter III. The VAR model will provide data for a 
reaction function where the Federal Reserve is reacting to information 
about the economy it may have known at the time of its policy decision. 
This study is concerned with how the priorities of monetary policy 
change in response to economic conditions. This can best be accomplished 
by observing how Federal Reserve intentions (as measured by FOMC 
directives rather than an intermediate target) react to economic 
conditions the Federal Reserve could have known at the time it made its 
policy decision. 
In Chapter II, I will review the literature on monetary policy 
reaction functions. I will present my model in detail in Chapter III. 
In Chapters IV and V, I will report the econometric results of this 
model, and I will summarize the forecasting methods in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There have been many studies which attempt to quantify the reaction 
of monetary policy to the state of the economy. In this chapter, I will 
briefly review the major papers that deal with monetary policy reaction 
functions. At the end of Chapter II, I will summarize these studies in 
Table 2.1a and Table 2.1b. These studies are presented in chronological 
order. 
William G. Dewald and Harry G. Johnson [11] were the first to apply 
the concept of a monetary policy reaction function to United States 
data.^ They studied the post-Accord period of 1952 through 1963 by 
relating each of three indicators of monetary policy (money supply, open 
market interest rates, and member bank reserves) to proxies of the four 
objectives of monetary policy (price stability, high employment, growth, 
and balance of payments equilibrium). Their best results were obtained 
using the money supply as the monetary indicator, but they noted that 
"this does not necessarily establish the money supply as the control 
variable actually used by the monetary authorities" [11, p. 174]. Dewald 
and Johnson conclude that during the period 1952-1961, unemployment and 
economic growth were the main concerns of monetary policy. 
Thomas Havrilesky [20] developed a monetary policy reaction function 
for the period 1952 to 1965 with two important distinctions from previous 
^Credit is given to Dr. G. L. Reuber [41] for the creation and first 
application of a monetary reaction function which was applied to Canadian 
data. 
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attempts. First, while using quarterly data, he assumed a one-period lag 
in the explanatory or objective variables. This was to insure unilateral 
causality. Secondly, Havrilesky used total reserves adjusted for changes 
in the legal reserve requirements as the monetary indicator. This was 
done because "free reserves, the money supply, and interest rates are 
somewhat ambiguous indicators of policy action as they often reflect 
market phenomena which are independent of monetary policy action" [20, 
p. 299]. The objectives of monetary policy were determined to be nominal 
income, unemployment, stable prices, and balance of payments surplus. 
All were found to significantly affect monetary policy with the exception 
of the balance of payments surplus. 
In a study of Federal Reserve policy, John H. Wood [51] viewed the 
monetary authorities as an economic agent similar to firms or consumers. 
Specifically, Wood assumed a disutility function which the Fed seeks to 
minimize. The arguments in the function were the squared deviations of 
the current values from the targeted values of income, unemployment, 
balance of trade, and the price level.^ For the monetary indicator. Wood 
used the change in the quantity of government securities held by the 
Federal Reserve. Wood concluded that during the period 1952 through 
1963, the Fed responded to changes in the price level, nominal GNP, and 
the balance of trade. 
In response to the Dewald and Johnson [11] paper, James W. Christian 
[9] developed a monetary policy reaction function. Christian believed 
^This method has been criticized because it weighs positive and 
negative deviations from the target value equally; for example, equal 
disutility from "too little" inflation as "too much" inflation. 
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that Dewald and Johnson made two critical errors. First, reaction 
function coefficients may represent both the effect of monetary policy on 
the policy objectives and the relative weight the Fed attaches to these 
objectives (due to reverse causation when using quarterly data), and 
second the Dewald and Johnson model did not test for regression coeffi­
cient stability. Christian's solution was to use 20-observation moving 
averages for each independent variable to aid in grouping the data into 
"periods of concern" about inflation, unemployment, growth, and balance 
of payments disequilibrium. These periods are the cyclical peaks and 
troughs of the independent variables. Then, moving regressions were run 
to test coefficient stability during different periods of concern. The 
monetary indicators used were the money supply, free reserves, and the 
treasury bill interest rate. Christian's results for the period 1952 
through 1966 suggest that the reaction function coefficients were not 
stable. Therefore, while the growth objective was significant throughout 
this period, the price stability, balance of payments, and employment 
objectives were intermittently important determinants of monetary 
policy. 
Michael Keran and Christopher Babb [25] developed a monetary policy 
reaction function in an attempt to explain the apparent discrepancy 
between stated monetary policy and Federal Reserve action. They believed 
that stated monetary policy intent (as measured by FOMC directives) 
deviated from actual policy (as measured by the monetary base) because 
actual policy must account for two additional objectives of monetary 
policy not discussed in Federal Reserve policy statements. These two 
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objectives were referred to as "even-keel" (or "making a market" during 
treasury debt financing) and "financial stability" (or being the "lender 
of last resort" during a financial panic). All other objectives were 
grouped into the category of "stabilization policy" (employment, infla­
tion, growth, and balance of payments). Keran and Babb tested the 
effects on monetary policy of these three objectives for the period of 
1933 to 1968. Their results suggest that during the 1933-1939 period the 
Fed was concerned with its stabilization and financial stability objec­
tives. From 1940 through 1952, Fed policy was dominated by the even-keel 
objective, probably due to war debt financing by the treasury. Finally, 
from 1953 through 1968, monetary policy was most responsive to financial 
stability and overall stabilization. 
As part of a larger study, Ronald Teigen [44] developed a monetary 
policy reaction function for the period 1953 through 1964. Teigen tested 
the relationship between the sum of unborrowed reserves and currency (the 
monetary indicator) and proxies of employment, prices, growth, and 
balance of payments (the goals of policy). The data were in the form of 
percentage changes. Teigen concludes that the Fed was responsive to 
income, the balance of payments (as measured by the short-term treasury 
bill rate), and to a lesser extent unemployment, but, surprisingly, 
monetary policy reacted very little to growth in output or inflation 
during this period. 
Ann Friedlaender [14] attempted to apply revealed preferences to the 
activities of the federal government to determine the weights attached to 
various macro policy goals for the period 1954 to 1964. The purpose was 
1 1  
to see if the weights changed from the Eisenhower years to the Kennedy-
Johnson years. Federal Reserve policy was just one of four federal 
policy instruments analyzed. Friedlaender used net free reserves as the 
monetary indicator and a dummy variable to test for a change in policy 
for the two political administrations. Her results suggest that the 
monetary authorities reacted to the price level and output objectives 
during the Eisenhower administration. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, 
the Fed responded to the price level and, to a lesser extent, short-term 
interest rate stability. 
Richard Froyen [16] developed a monetary policy reaction function 
which contained a feature that distinguished his study from previous 
attempts. Froyen used monthly data to remove the potential for reverse 
causation. He also noted that monthly data conforms more closely with 
Federal Reserve policy periods because the FOMC meets once a month. For 
monetary indicators, Froyen used the monetary base and the sum of 
unborrowed reserves plus currency held by the public. The objectives of 
monetary policy tested were one month lagged values of unemployment, 
inflation, balance of payments surplus, total sales and the two financial 
objectives of stable long-term interest rates (proxy for overall finan­
cial stability), and outstanding debt (proxy for the "making a market" 
objective). Froyen broke his study intro three subperiods. During the 
first period of 1953 through 1960, Froyen concluded that the monetary 
authorities reacted to the unemployment rate and total sales. From 1961 
through 1968, the Fed responded to unemployment, inflation, total sales, 
the public debt, and financial stability objectives. During the final 
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period of 1969 through 1972, the Fed reacted to unemployment, total 
sales, balance of payments, and financial stability. It is noteworthy 
that in all three periods both unemployment and total sales had signifi­
cant effects on monetary policy. With respect to the total sales 
objective, it would appear the Fed usually accommodated increases in the 
transactions demand for money. 
To test the Federal Reserve's response to the state of the economy, 
Havrilesky, Sapp, and Schweitzer [21] developed a monetary policy 
reaction function for the period 1964-1974. The indicator chosen was the 
federal funds rate, which has since been used by many researchers. The 
objectives of monetary policy were assumed to be one month lagged values 
of the unemployment rate, price level, money supply, and international 
financial position (represented by the dollar/Deutsche mark exchange 
rate). They grouped monthly data into periods of "tight money" and "easy 
money." During tight money periods, it appears the Fed reacted to the 
price level and the exchange rate. During easy money periods, they 
conclude that the Fed responded to unemployment and exchange rates in the 
hypothesized manner, but in some instances the Fed responded to the price 
level in a perverse manner. 
Paul DeRosa and Gary Stern [10] developed a monetary policy reaction 
function for the purpose of detecting the supposed shift by the Fed in 
early 1970 toward a monetary aggregate strategy. To accomplish this, 
they compared the coefficients of a reaction function estimated for the 
1967 through 1969 period to those estimated for the 1970 through 1974 
period. DeRosa and Stern used the federal funds rate as the monetary 
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indicator and tested the effect of lagged values of both the federal 
funds rate and the money supply on this indicator. From 1967 through 
1969, the lagged value of the federal funds rate was significant, but 
from 1970 through 1974 the lagged money supply was a significant deter­
minant of policy. Thus, DeRosa and Stern concluded that the shift in 
policy strategy was detectable although their results suggest that the 
Fed did react cautiously to changes in the money supply from 1970 through 
1974. 
In a very similar study. Chase Econometrics [8] created a reaction 
function for the same purpose as the DeRosa-Stern paper; that is, to 
discover if the Fed has reacted more noticeably to monetary aggregates 
since 1970. Using the federal funds rate for the monetary indicator, and 
lagged changes in money, unemployment, and prices for the objectives of 
montary policy, their results indicate that the Fed did in fact react to 
monetary aggregates in the 1970-1978 period. During the period 1966 to 
1970, the Fed did not respond to changes in the money supply, but it did 
react to changes in unemployment. 
Glenn Potts and Dudley Luckett [38] developed a monetary policy 
reaction function to discover whether presidential administrations are a 
meaningful way to classify Federal Reserve response to the goals of 
employment, growth, price stability, and balance of payments equilibrium. 
Their choice of a monetary indicator is most interesting. They 
classified monetary policy into "tight" or "easy" periods directly from 
their reading of the minutes of the FOMC monthly meetings. This 
eliminates many of the problems associated with the monetary indicators 
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previously discussed. Using discriminant analysis on monthly data from 
1956 through 1975, Potts and Luckett concluded that during the Eisenhower 
administration the Fed was most concerned with the objectives of stable 
prices and growth. The Kennedy-Johnson period was dominated by concern 
with unemployment and growth, and by a lesser extent stable prices. 
During the Nixon-Ford era, the Fed was concerned with unemployment, and 
to a lesser degree growth, and, surprisingly, the Fed apparently did not 
respond to the objective of stable prices. The balance of payments 
objective was not a significant determinant of monetary policy during any 
period studied. In a related study, Luckett and Potts [29] again used 
discriminant analysis, this time to test Tufte's [45] thesis, which has 
implied that the Fed is a tool for partisan politics. That is, the Fed 
is expansionary prior to a presidential election, and contractionary 
after the election. Luckett and Potts grouped the data into the period 
two years prior to an election and the two years after the election for 
the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford years. Their results do not indicate 
that the Fed was more concerned with employment and growth in the 
preelection periods, nor more concerned with inflation in the 
postelection periods. 
As Luckett and Potts had done, Robert Avery [6] developed a monetary 
policy reaction function with an innovative policy indicator. His 
monetary indicator was a vector containing borrowing by member banks from 
the Fed, net free reserves, the federal funds rate, call rates of 
government bond dealers, the three-month treasury bill rate, and the 
discount rate. He tested the response of this indicator to changes in 
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unemployment, growth, prices, and international equilibrium for the 
period 1955 to 1975. All goal variables significantly affected monetary 
policy. Most noteworthy, the balance of payments proxy was significant, 
a result few researchers have obtained. 
Basil Moore [32] created a monetary policy reaction function to test 
the influence of the money wage rate on the monetary base. Moore's 
thesis is that the money supply is endogenous due to pressure from the 
financial markets to accommodate changes in the money wage rate. If this 
hypothesis is not rejected, doubt would be cast on the monetarist view 
that the money supply is the single most important determinant of nominal 
income. Moore suggests that excessive wage demands (exceeding the growth 
in labor productivity) cause increased demand for credit. If the central 
bank does not accommodate the increased credit demand, the financial 
markets will become unstable resulting in rising unemployment. If they 
do accommodate the increased credit demand, the price level and nominal 
income will rise. Moore's statistical results for the period 1951 to 
1977 suggest that the money wage rate has a highly significant influence 
on movements in the monetary base. 
Richard Abrams, Richard Froyen, and Rodger Waud [1] studied the 
period when Arthur Burns was the chairman of the Federal Reserve—1970 
through 1977. They tested the reaction of the federal funds rate to 
"predicted"^ values of unemployment, inflation, the money supply, and 
^Abrams, Froyen, and Waud [1] used various econometric methods to 
derive data that the Fed could have known at the time it made each policy 
decision. Some variables were forward forecasts. For discussion of the 
forecasting methods, see [1, pp. 35-37]. 
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dollar devaluation. All coefficients were found to be significant. In 
particular, because the money supply was significant, they concluded that 
the Fed did respond to monetary aggregates which many observers had 
doubted. In addition, they found no evidence of reaction function 
coefficient instability. This suggests that the Fed reacts to economic 
conditions systematically. 
James Barth, Robin Sickles, and Philip Weist [7] employed a 
generalized spline estimator technique to a Federal Reserve reaction 
function which allowed the marginal response by the Fed to economic 
conditions to vary according to the severity of these conditions. For 
example, one might expect the monetary authorities to react differently 
to a one percent rise in inflation when inflation is seven percent rather 
than four percent. They utilized the monetary base as the indicator of 
policy, and inflation, unemployment, changes in short-term interest 
rates, total sales, and the full employment budget surplus as the 
objectives of policy for the period 1953 to 1978. Their results indicate 
that the Fed was most responsive to inflation when it was unusually high, 
but surprisingly the Fed responded less systematically to unemployment. 
For the purpose of testing political influence on monetary policy, 
Myles Wallace and John Warner [49] developed a monetary policy reaction 
function. They chose the monetary base, federal funds rate, free 
reserves, and a dichotomous variable of "tight" and "easy" money for the 
policy indicators. The independent variables adopted were the standard 
objectives of monetary policy plus a dummy variable for one year and two 
years preceding a presidential election. They conclude that during the 
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period 1956 to 1980, only the Nixon administration, and to a lesser 
extent the Johnson and Eisenhower administrations, were associated with 
expansion prior to an election.^ 
Leroy Laney and Thomas Willett [27] developed a Federal Reserve 
reaction function to test whether the election cycle has influenced the 
behavior of the money supply. They tested for two separate mechanisms 
through which the presidential electoral cycle could affect monetary 
expansion—direct (Fed catering to party in power) and indirect (partisan 
politics affecting variables to which the Fed responds such as wage 
demands and government deficits). Using annual data for the 1960-1976 
period, Laney and Willett concluded that the money supply was unaffected 
directly by the election cycle. However, their evidence suggests that 
the Fed does react indirectly to the election cycle through the election-
induced deficit component of the federal deficit. 
Finally, with the purpose of testing the impact of fiscal variables 
(real government expenditures and the real deficit) on the money supply, 
Stuart Allen and Michael Smith [3] created a monetary reaction function 
for the 1961 through 1980 period. Using quarterly data, they regressed 
current and lagged values of the change in the money supply, real govern­
ment expenditures, and outstanding federal debt on the monetary base. 
They concluded that the federal debt had a positive and significant 
influence on money creation. In addition, they rejected the hypothesis 
^This paper was not included in Table 2.1b because only the 
significance of the dummy variables were reported. It is included here 
because political effects on monetary policy are tested in this disserta­
tion. 
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of coefficient stability in this reaction function for the period 
studied. 
In light of these past studies, it should be clear that researchers 
have related many monetary indicators to many objectives of monetary 
policy. However, it may not be clear that the necessity to use so many 
"goals" or "objectives" of monetary policy may be due to specification 
error of the indicator. For example, many studies have used the deficit 
and money wage rates to "sort out" accommodative monetary policy so as to 
better analyze monetary policy intent. This may be necessary when using 
monetary aggregates or the monetary base as an indicator of policy, but 
it is unnecessary when using a dichotcmcus variable of "tight money" 
versus "easy money" obtained directly from analyzing the Record of Policy 
Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee as the indicator of monetary 
policy intent. In addition, the use of money market indicators of policy 
(federal funds rate, three-month treasury bill rate, etc.) also requires 
the addition of independent variables in the model to remove exogenous 
market effects from movements in the indicator. 
Finally, only in the Abrams, Froyen, and Waud [1] paper were methods 
used to "forecast" data such that the model allowed the monetary 
authorities to react to information that they would likely have known at 
the time they made their policy decisions. In addition, this allowed for 
the possibility that the Fed reacts to expectations of future values of 
the objectives of monetary policy. 
For these reasons, I will develop a model of Federal Reserve 
reaction to the objectives of monetary policy in the following chapter. 
1 9  
It is a dichotomous qualitative response model with independent variables 
which are forecasts of the objectives of monetary policy. 
2 0  
Table 2.1a. Glossary of symbols and notes for Table 2.1b 
Glossary of Symbols : 
U = Unemployment 
P = Inflation rate or the absolute change in price index 
BPS = Balance of payments surplus 
Y/P = Real income (or proxy for production) 
Y = Nominal income 
TS = Total sales (business sales) 
XR = Exchange rate 
D = Outstanding U.S. government debt in hands of public 
r = Short term interest rate, T-bill rate, Federal funds rate 
FES = Full employment federal government budget surplus 
M = Monetary aggregate (many) 
Gap = Difference between desired and actual output (Y^ - Y^) 
FR = Free reserves 
W = Money wage rate 
ED = Election dummy 
HED = High employment deficit 
EID = Election induced deficit 
G = Real government expenditure 
Notes : 
(+) means positive significant coefficient, (-) means negative 
significant coefficient at the 5 percent level or better 
(0) means insignificant coefficient at 5 percent level 
A represents annual data 
Q represents quarterly data 
M represents monthly data 
Table 2.1b. Summary of previous estimates of monetary policy reaction 
functions 
Time 
Study Method of test period Dependent variable 
Dewald & Johnson Multiple regression 1952 I Money supply 
[11] 1961 IV 
Multiple regression 1952 I T-bill rate 
1961 IV 
Multiple regression 1952 I T-bond rate 
1961 IV 
Multiple regression 1952 I Free reserves 
1961 IV 
Goldfeld [18] Multiple regression 1950 III Potential demand 
1962 II deposits 
Havrilesky [20] Multiple regression 1952 II "Adjusted" total 
1965 IV reserves 
Wood [51] Two-stage least 1952 I Fed holdings of 
squares 1963 IV gov't securities 
Christian [9] Multiple regression 1952 I Money supply 
1966 IV 
Multiple regression 1952 I Free reserves 
1966 IV 
Multiple regression 1952 I Treasury bill rate 
1966 IV 
Keran & Babb Multiple regression 1933 III Monetary base 
[25] 1939 IV 
Multiple regression 1940 I Monetary base 
1952 IV 
Multiple regression 1953 I Monetary base 
1968 IV 
Teigen [44] Multiple regression 1953 I Unborrowed reserves 
1964 IV plus currency 
Friedlaender Multiple regression 1954 I Net free reserves 
[14] 1960 IV 
Multiple regression 1961 I Net free reserves 
1964 IV 
^eigen used an income proxy for sensitivity to unemployment. 
^The sensitivity to 'r' was interpreted as sensitivity to potential 
international capital flows. 
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Form of Data 
data Frequency U P BPS Y/P Y TS XR D r FES M Gap FR W 
level Q +00+ 
level Q — + — -
level Q - + 00 
level Q + 0 + + 
level Q +00 + 
level 
change Q 0 - + 
change Q + - + + 
change Q 0-0 
change Q 0+0 
change Q - 0 
change Q +0 
change Q 0 + 
percent Q +^ 0 + 
change 
level Q 0+0 0 
level Q 0-0 -

22 
P BPS Y/P Y TS XR D 
0 0 + 
0 0 
+ + 
0 
+ 0 
0 + 
FES M Gap FR W ED HED EID G 
0 0 

Table 2.1b. Continued 
Study Method of test 
Time 
period Dependent variable 
Froyen [16] Multiple regression 1953: 2 Monetary base 
1961: 1 
Multiple regression 1961: 2 Monetary base 
1969: 1 
Multiple regression 1969: 2 Monetary base 
1972: 12 
Havrilesky, Sapp, Tight 
and Schweitzer money 
[21] Multiple regression 1964: 1 Federal funds rate 
1966: 11 
Multiple regression 1967: 12 Federal funds rate 
1968: 6 & 
1969: 1 
1970: 1 
Multiple regression 1971: 8 Federal funds rate 
1972: 9 
Easy 
money 
Multiple regression 1966: 12 Federal funds rate 
1967: 11 & 
1968: 7 
1968: 12 
Multiple regression 1970: 2 Federal funds rate 
1971: 7 
Multiple regression 1972: 9 Federal funds rate 
1974: 2 
DeRosa & Stern Multiple regression 1967: 3 Federal funds rate 
[10] 1969: 12 
Multiple regression 1970: 12 Federal funds rate 
1974: 12 
Chase Econometrics Multiple regression 1966: 1 Federal funds rate 
[8] 1970: 2 
1970: 3 Federal funds rate 
1978: 1 
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Form of Data 
data Frequency BPS Y/P Y TS XR FES M Gap FR W 
level 
level 
level 
M 
M 
M 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
level 
level 
M 0 + 
0 + 
level M 0 + 
level M 
level 
level 
M 
M 
0 
0 
percent 
change 
percent 
change 
change 
change 
M 
M 
M 

24 
P BPS Y/P Y TS XR FES M Gao FR W ED HED EID 
0 
0 
0 0 
+ 0 
+ 0 

Table 2.1b. Continued 
Time 
Study Method of test period Dependent variable 
Potts & Luckett Discriminant 1956: 1 Tight money vs 
[38] analysis 1975: 12 easy money 
Discriminant 1956: 1 Tight money vs 
analysis 1961: 1 easy money 
Discriminant 1961: 2 Tight money vs 
analysis 1969: 1 easy money 
Discriminant 1969: 2 Tight money vs 
analysis 1975: 12 easy money 
Avery [6] Multiple regression 1955: 1 "Unobserved 
1975: 4 variable" 
Moore [32] Multiple regression 1951: 6 Monetary base 
1977: 6 
Multiple regression 1951: II Monetary base 
1977 II 
Abrams, Froyen 
and Waud [1] 
Luckett & Potts 
[29] 
Three-pass 
least squares 
Discriminant 
analysis 
Discriminant 
analysis 
Discriminant 
analysis 
Discriminant 
analysis 
1970: 3 
1977: 3 
1963: 
1964: 
1967: 
1963: 
1961: 
1962: 
1965: 
1966: 
1971: 
1972: 
1975: 
1976: 
1969: 
1970: 
1973: 
1974: 
1-
11 
1-
11 
2-
12 
2-
12 
1-
11 
1-
11 
2-
12 
2-
12 
Federal funds rate 
Tight money vs 
easy money 
Tight money vs 
easy money 
Tight money vs 
easy money 
Tight money vs 
easy money 
^Significant at the 10 percent level with expected signs. 
^The monetary indicator is a vector of six instruments and 
intermediate targets, therefore its direction can not be established with 
respect to tight money or easy money. Avery suggests that a positive 
change in this indicator is contractionary. 
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Form of Data 
data Frequency 
change & 
level 
change & 
level 
change & 
level 
change & 
level 
M 
M 
M 
U P BPS Y/P Y TS XR D 
- 0 0  +  
0 + 0 + 
+c 0 + 
- 0 0  + =  
FES M Gap FR W 
change M 
logs 
logs 
M 
Q 
level M 
change & 
level 
M 
change & 
level 
M 
:hange & 
level 
M 
change & 
level 
M 

26 
BPS Y/P Y TS X R  
0 0 
+ 0 
+= 0 
0 0 
r FES M Gap FR W ED HED EID G 
0 + 

Table 2.1b. Continued 
Study Method of test 
Time 
period Dependent variable 
Barth, Sickles, 
& Weist [7] 
Generalized spline 1953: 1 
estimator 1978: 2 
Monetary base 
Laney and Willett Multiple regression 1960-1976 Money supply 
[27] 
Multiple regression 1960-1976 Money supply 
Allen & Smith 
[3] 
Multiple regression 1961 III 
1980 IV 
Monetary base 
®Laney and Willett defined "Gap" as the difference between actual and 
potential output (Y^ - Y^). 
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Form of Data 
data Frequency U P BPS Y/P Y TS XR D r FES M Gap FR W E 
level 
level & 
change 
level & 
change 
A 
A 
logs 
+ 0 

28 
U P BPS Y/P Y TS XR D r FES M Gap FR W ED HED EID G 
+ - + 0 
+ 0 
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CHAPTER III. SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section develops a 
theoretical model of Federal Reserve policy adoption and the econometric 
reaction function used to estimate the coefficients in this model; the 
second section presents the method of data generation of the independent 
variables employed in the reaction function; and the third section 
presents a discussion of the policy indicator which is the dependent 
variable in the reaction function. 
A Model of Federal Reserve Policy Adoption 
The Federal Reserve faces outcomes from the adoption of a monetary 
policy that are uncertain. In this model, the Fed is assumed to adopt an 
easy money policy or a tight money policy based upon an objective of 
utility maximization. Denote a policy index p where p=l for a tight 
money policy, and p=2 for an easy money policy, and denote a utility 
function U(G .) that ranks the Fed's preference for policy during the 
pi 
i-th time period.^ Utility depends on a vector of moments that 
describe the goals of policy. The variables in are unobserved, but a 
linear relationship is postulated for the i-th time period between the 
utility derived from the p-th policy and a vector of observed (or fore­
cast) time period specific economic conditions (e.g., growth in 
^This utility function can be viewed as if the Fed is a single 
decision making unit. Alternatively, this utility function could be that 
of the median voter on the Federal Open Market Committee. This second 
approach more closely aligns with the method of policy classification 
found in Potts [37]. 
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output, inflation, unemployment, and international balance) and a zero 
mean random disturbance term e : 
P 
U . = X.Qt + e ., p = 1, 2; i = 1 ... n. (3.1) 
pi 1 p pi 
The Fed is assumed to choose the policy that gives them the largest 
utility. For example, the Fed will adopt or continue an easy money 
policy if exceeds and the dichotomous qualitative variable D. 
indexes this policy decision: 
1 if U,. < U„., adopt or continue easy money policy. 
= { J (3.2) 
0 if adopt or continue tight money policy. 
The probability that equals one can be expressed as a function of time 
period specific economic conditions: 
P. 
1 
P (D.=l) = F (U,. < U„.), 
r 1 r li 2i 
( 3 . 3 )  
^r^^i"l ®li ^ Xi°2 ®2i^' 
^ ^ r^®li ~ ®2i ^  Xi(°2 ~ "l^^' 
= P (u. < X . g )  =  F ( X . g )  
r 1 1 1 
where P^(') = a probability statement, 
u£ = e^^ - e2^ = a new random disturbance term, 
^There is indecision of U2£ = U^-, but this happens with zero 
probability if eo- and e,- are continuous random variables. See Amemiya 
[4]. 
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B =@2 - = a new coefficient vector, and 
F(X.B) = the cumulative distribution function for u. evaluated at 
X . g .  
1 
Thus, the probability of the Fed adopting an easy money policy is the 
probability that the utility to the Fed generated by a tight money policy 
is exceeded by the utility generated by an easy money policy, or the 
cumulative distribution function F evaluated at X.6. The exact distribu-
1 
tion for F depends on the distribution of the random disturbance term 
u. = e,. - e„.. If the distribution of u. is uniform, then F is 
1 li 2i 1 
triangular and the model is specified as a linear probability model; if 
the distribution of u. is normal, then F is a cumulative normal and the 
model is specified as a probit probability model. 
The marginal effect of a variable X^, j=l ... k and k = the number 
of independent variables in X, on the probability of adopting an easy 
money policy is 3p^/3X.j = f(X.B) • 6^ where f(') is the probability 
density function of u.. The direction of the marginal effect is 
determined by the sign of but 6^ represents coefficient differences 
Thus, Bj is expected to be positive (negative, zero) if 
is positive and greater than (less than, equal to) 
The preceding model can be estimated with the reaction function: 
Y = XB + V (3.4) 
^This model is a transformation of a model described by Amemiya [4] 
and used by Rahm and Huffman [40]. 
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where Y = an nxl column vector of D^, 
X = an nxk matrix of k explanatory variables for n periods, 
3 = a kxl column vector of estimated coefficients, and 
v = an nxl column vector of error terms. 
This model will be estimated using ordinary least squares for a linear 
probability model^ and a maximum likelihood probit procedure for a 
2 
probit probability model. 
To better explain the elements of the X matrix, the reaction 
function can be expressed in scalar form: 
D. = b„ + b,GO. + b^I. + b,U. + b IB. + v. (3.5) 
1 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 
where GO., I., U., and IB. represent the independent variables of the X 
matrix and: 
GO. = growth in output, 
I. = rate of inflation, 
U. = unemployment, 
IB. = international balance, and 
V .  = error term. 
1 
The superscript ( ) denotes forecasts of a variable, to be explained 
presently. 
There is heteroscedasticity in a linear probability model if it is 
estimated with ordinary least squares. This produces unbiased 
coefficients that are not minimum variance. If this is corrected with 
generalized least squares, the coefficients will be minimum variance, but 
they will now be biased. For a further discussion of heteroscedasticity 
in a linear probability model, see Ladd [26]. 
^This procedure is developed in Pindyck and Rubinfeld [35], p. 310. 
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The Independent Variables in the Reaction Function 
At the time they make the policy decisions, the members of the 
Federal Open Market Committee do not know the current values of the 
economic goals of monetary policy. It is, therefore, plausible that they 
base their decisions on forecasts of these goal variables. For this 
reason, the reaction function will be estimated using the "predicted" 
values of these goal variables from an unrestricted vector autoregression 
of the following specification. 
Assume that growth (z^), inflation (z^), unemployment (z^), and 
international balance (z^) are jointly determined as part of an m-
variable (m>4) vector stochastic process which can be approximated by the 
r-th order vector autoregression: 
Z(t) = A(l)Z(t-l) + A(2)Z(t-2) + ... + A(r)Z(t-r) + W(t) (3.6) 
where Z(t) is an mxl vector of variables (which includes z^(t) ... z^(t); 
A(j), j=l ... r, are mxm matrices of the time-invariant coefficients; 
and W(t) is an mxl vector of disturbances; note: ra = number of variables 
in the vector and r = number of periods lagged. The Z(t) process is 
assumed to be stationary. 
Each of the m equations in equation (3.6) can be estimated by 
ordinary least squares.^ This may be understood more clearly if equation 
^For a proof of the consistency of OLS and of the equivalence of OLS 
and GLS under these conditions, see Anderson and Taylor [5], cited by 
[12, p. 113]. 
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(3.6) is expressed in scalar form for the two variables (m=2), two period 
lag (r=2) case: 
^It *11,1 =l,t-l *12,1 =2,t-l *11,2 ^l,t-2 
+ *12,2 =2,t-2 + *lt' (3-7) 
^2t *21,1 ^l,t-l *22,1 =2,t-l *21,2 =l,t-2 
+ *22,2 =2,t-2 + *2t (3'G) 
where the coefficient subscripts are (in order): 
1st—dependent variable, 
2nd—endogenous variable, and 
3rd—periods lagged. 
In matrix form, showing explicitly the elements of the matrices: 
- — 
— — 
^It 
_ 
*11,1 *12,1 ^l,t-l 
+ 
*11,2 *12,2 ^l,t-2 
+ 
^2t *21,1 *22,1 =2,t-l *21,2 *22,2 =2,C-2 rt
 
Forecasts of the monthly values of the objectives of monetary policy 
will be generated using the estimated coefficient from this VAR model. 
In utilizing data which has been forecast from an unrestricted VAR model, 
it has been assumed that the Fed has "consistent" or "partly rational" 
expectations [31, pp. 50-51]. 
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It is important to note a few points about this forecasting method. 
It has not been assumed that the Fed actually forecasts the goal 
variables in the manner described. It has been assumed that the data set 
used in this study consistently reflects the information the Fed has 
available for policy decisions. Specifically, the data set used may 
include fewer variables than the Fed's actual data set. It is, there­
fore, necessary to assume that any additional data the Fed uses for 
forecasting is uncorrelated with the data set used in this study. This 
will allow for the reaction function coefficients to be consistent 
estimates of the true parameters in the model. It should be noted, 
however, that the parameter estimates will be less efficient the greater 
the Fed's forecasts differ from the forecasts developed in this study. 
This difference is not measurable because the Fed's actual forecasts 
cannot be obtained. 
The Policy Indicator 
As previously stated, this study is concerned with the intent of 
monetary policy. It would be improper to use money market variables or 
monetary aggregates as the indicators of policy because these indicators 
may measure actual policy, not intended policy. 
Monetary policy intent was classified as "tight" or "easy" by an 
evaluation of the monthly Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open 
Market Committee published in the Annual Report of the Board of 
Governors. This series was created by Glenn Potts [37] for the period 
1956 through 1975 and was extended by Wallace and Warner [49] to include 
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1953 through 1955 and 1976 through 1984.^ These data were transformed 
2 
for use as the dependent variable in equations 3.4 or 3.5. 
Although this type of policy indicator avoids the problems 
associated with the money market or monetary aggregate indicators, it 
does raise problems of its own. The obvious problem is subjectivity in 
the classification of a continuous variable (monetary policy) into a 
binary classification of "tight money" and "easy money." In defense of 
this classification, it should be noted that independent evaluations of 
3 
the Record of Policy Actions of the FOMC are nearly identical. 
^The series created by Potts was published in his dissertation, 
while the extensions of this series created by Wallace and Warner were 
obtained by request. 
2 Tight money periods were represented by "0" and easy money periods 
were represented by "1." 
^This method of classification has been employed independently by 
William Poole [36], Glenn Potts [37], and Wallace and Warner [49]. The 
only disagreement seems to be 1961(1I)-I963(6). For a discussion of this 
period of disagreement and the method of classification, see Potts [37, 
pp. 16-21]. 
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CHAPTER IV. DATA, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION FOR THE FULL SAMPLE 
PERIOD REACTION FUNCTIONS—1953(2) THROUGH 1984(4) 
The timespan for this portion of the study is February 1953 through 
April 1984. Although data prior to 1953 were available, they were not 
used because there is some doubt as to the independence of Federal 
Reserve decision making prior to the Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord. 
The sample period is divided into subperiods according to two 
schemes. First, the data are grouped into three subperiods corresponding 
to the tenure of the different chairmen of the Board of Governors. 
Second, the data are divided into two subperiods: the two-year periods 
that precede presidential elections and the two-year periods that follow 
presidential elections. 
The Data 
Monthly values of personal income, the industrial production index, 
the producer price index, the consumer price index, the unemployment 
rate, the balance of trade surplus,^ the Ml money supply, and the three-
month Treasury bill rate were obtained from various issues of Business 
Statistics and Survey of Current Business. This list of variables 
includes the goal or target variables to be used in the reaction function 
plus additional variables thought to affect the target variables in 
future periods. 
^The balance of trade surplus was calculated by differencing the 
monthly value of exports and general imports. This series was used 
because balance of trade and balance of payments data are quarterly 
series. Although available on a monthly basis, exchange rate data were 
not used because of the existence of fixed exchange rates prior to 1973. 
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All data series must be stationary for use in a vector autoregres-
sion. To accomplish this, the following transformations were made on the 
original data: 
Target variables: 
1) personal income (PI)—first difference of the log of the 
levels, 
2) industrial production index (IP)—first difference of the 
log of the levels, 
3) producer price index (PPI)—first difference of the log of 
the levels, 
4) consumer price index (CPI)—second difference of the log of 
the levels, 
5) unemployment (U)—first difference of the levels, and 
6) balance of trade surplus (BT)—first difference of the 
levels divided by personal income. 
Additional variables: 
7) three-month Treasury bill rate (TI)—first difference of the 
log of the levels, and 
8) money supply (M)—second difference of the log of the 
levels. 
After the transformation, personal income, the industrial production 
index, the producer price index, and the three-month Treasury bill rate 
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are in the form of growth rates. The consumer price index and the money 
supply are in the form of a change in the growth rate. Unemployment is 
simply the change in the unemployment rate, while the balance of trade 
surplus is the change in the balance of trade as a proportion of personal 
income. The transformed data were utilized in a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model of the form of equation 3.6, which can be found on page 33. 
A sixth-order VAR model was chosen to "forecast" the potential target 
2 
variables. Of these target variables, only the forecast of the CPI was 
in a form not desired for final use in the reaction function. Conse­
quently, the forecast of the change in the growth rate of the CPI was 
converted into the growth rate of the CPI. 
One should note that these forecasts are not true forward forecasts. 
The forecasts are the predicted values of the variables in the VAR. 
Therefore, this method can be criticized on two grounds. First, data 
from the full sample period were used to generate the forecasting coeffi­
cients. Therefore, information was used to generate these forecasts that 
was not available to the monetary authorities at the time they made their 
^The growth rate of x(t) = g^: 
_ dx(t) 1 _ d ln[x(t)], 
Sx dt * x(, t ) ït 
gjj ~ In x(t) - In x(t-l). 
2 A system log likelihood test was performed on the VAR model to test 
the significance of additional restrictions; these restrictions were the 
use of fewer lags than six in the system. Starting with six lags on each 
variable, the restriction of one lag fewer was tested from six lags 
through three lags. The sixth lag was significant at the ten percent 
level, while all others were significant at the five percent or one 
percent level. For this reason, a symmetric lag structure of six periods 
was employed. 
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forecasts. Second, the coefficients may not be time invariant. However, 
if the various time series exhibit the property of ergodicity, these 
problems do not exist and the predicted values are the same as fore­
casts . ^ 
Table 4.1 shows Che correlation between the predicted and actual 
values of the target variables. Although this correlation is relevant in 
determining the quality of the forecasts, it does not provide information 
about how closely these forecasts correlate with the Fed's actual 
forecasts because the Fed's actual forecasts cannot be obtained. 
Table 4.1. Correlation between actual and predicted values of the target 
variables generated from a fixed-coefficient VAR model: 
1953(2)-1984(4) 
Target variable Correlation 
1. Personal income (PI) .51 
2. Industrial production index (IP) .62 
3. Producer price index (PPI) .57 
4. Consumer price index (CPI)^ . 6 2  
5. Unemployment (U) .65 
6. Balance of trade (BT) .65 
^Correlation of second differences of the logs of the levels. 
There is no test for the existence of ergodicity in a time series, 
therefore none was performed. For an explanation of an ergodic time 
series, see Fuller [17, p. 230]. 
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The Reaction Function 
The target variables can be placed into the four categories of the 
objectives of monetary policy: 
1) growth in output—PI or IP, 
2) price stability—CPI or PPI, 
3) unemployment—Û, and 
4) international balance—BT. 
Two output and two price variables can be combined into four 
combinations. For this reason, four different reaction functions were 
estimated for each subperiod studied. However, to avoid the reporting of 
redundant results, only one form of the reaction function is reported in 
this chapter. It is of the following form: 
Pc = <0 + 'l^\ + CgPPIt ^ ^ 3"t ^ \ (4.1) 
where P = policy indicator, 0 = tight money, 1 = easy money; 
IP = predicted value of the growth rate of the industrial production 
index ; 
PPI = predicted value of the growth rate of the producer price 
index ; 
Û = predicted value of the change in unemployment percentage; 
BT = predicted value of the change in the balance of trade as a 
proportion of personal income; 
E = error term. 
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The industrial production index was chosen as the proxy for growth in 
output because it is a real variable. Furthermore, personal income was 
not used because it is a nominal variable which tends to be highly 
correlated with the price variables. The choice of the PPI over the CPI 
was somewhat arbitrary. Reaction functions fitted with the PPI tended to 
out perform those fitted with the CPI, but in most periods the results 
were not sensitive to the choice of an inflation proxy.^ 
If the Fed does base its policy decisions on the objectives in 
equation 4.1, the following relationships should exist: 
1) high economic growth is associated with a tight money policy 
(c^ < 0), ceteris paribus, 
2) rising prices are associated with a tight money policy (c^ < 0), 
ceteris paribus, 
3) rising unemployment is associated with an easy money policy 
(Cg > 0), ceteris paribus, and 
4) a rising balance of payments surplus is associated with an easy 
money policy (c^ > 0), ceteris paribus. 
Results of Subperiods Classified by Chairmen 
of the Board of Governors 
Equation 4.1 was estimated as a linear probability model and as a 
probit probability model for the three subperiods that correspond with 
the chairmanships of William McChesney Martin, Jr. (1953(2)-1970(1)), 
^Alternative lag structures of one and two periods in either 
direction from the policy indicator were also tested. The results were 
not significantly different, therefore the reaction function was 
estimated with forecasts of concurrent target variables. 
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Arthur F. Burns (1970(2)-1978(1)), and Paul A. Volcker (1979(9)-
1984(4)).^ Analysis of these three periods will provide inferences as to 
the objectives of monetary policy during each chairman's tenure. Also, 
this analysis will provide a framework to discuss differences among 
priority systems used during the different chairmanships. 
The Martin years, February 1953-January 1970 
Table 4.2 presents the results of ordinary least squares and probit 
estimates of the reaction function for the Martin years. The F-ratio and 
2 the X value are both significant at the one percent level. This 
suggests that the policy-adoption decision of tight money or easy money 
is influenced by the policy objectives in the reaction function. The 
estimated coefficients of unemployment and the producer price index are 
also highly significant and carry the expected sign. The beta 
coefficient of the producer price index is similar in size to that of 
unemployment, suggesting that the Fed may have been nearly equally 
2 
concerned with the price level and unemployment. Apparently, growth and 
the balance of trade were not influential factors in the policy adoption 
decisions during Martin's tenure. 
^G. William Miller's chairmanship was excluded because his tenure 
only lasted approximately 19 months. In addition, the results of the 
reaction function estimation for this period were insignificant. 
^Beta coefficients (sometimes called standardized or normalized 
coefficients) can be used directly to make statements about the relative 
importance of the independent variables in a multiple regression model. 
They are formed by performing an OLS on variables where each variable is 
normalized by subtracting its mean and dividing by its estimated standard 
deviation. The beta coefficients reported in this study should be 
interpreted with caution, however, because the linear reaction function 
is heteroscedastic. See Ladd [26]. 
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Table 4.2. Results of the Martin years, 1953(2)-1970(1) 
Probability model 
Linear^ Probit b 
Independent Beta Estimated Estimated 
variable coefficient coefficient*" t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept - 0.49105 - -0.026277 -
IP 0.027239 2.0210 0.288 7.9711 0.380 
PPI -0.29619 -59.315*** -4.494 -171.02*** -4.229 
U 0.25183 0.86714*** 2.646 2.5439** 2.544 
BT 0.0078069 0.014121 0.121 0.037656 0.108 
= 204, = .17, F = 10.288***. 
= 204, log likelihood = -120.48, chi-square = 37.217***. 
^*, **, and *** appearing in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 
indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
t-tests are two-tailed while F and tests are one-tailed. 
The Burns years, February 1970-January 1978 
Table 4.3 presents the results of ordinary least squares and probit 
estimates of the reaction function for the Burns years. The results are 
strikingly different from the other periods estimated. Neither the F-
2 
ratio nor the X value are significant at the ten percent level; conse­
quently, the hypothesis that all slope coefficients equal zero cannot be 
2 
rejected. Furthermore, the R is low suggesting that very little of the 
variance in the policy indicator is explained by the objectives of policy 
employed in this form of the model. The industrial production index and 
balance of trade coefficients enter with incorrect signs, but the 
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Table 4.3. Results of the Burns years, 1970(2)-1978(1) 
Probability model 
Linear^ Probit^ 
Independent 
variable 
Beta 
coefficient 
Estimated 
coefficient t-ratio 
Estimated 
coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept - 0.69598 - 0.54804 -
IP 0.13945 8.9181 0 .803 27.633 0.810 
PPI -0.097983 -12.200 -0 .094 -37.718 -1.021 
Û 0.30103 0.92597* 1 .759 2.9849* 1.808 
BT -0.012398 -0.015251 -0 .120 -0.077261 -0.210 
= 96, = .05, F = 1.191. 
= 96, log likelihood = -58.425, chi-square = 5.361. 
coefficients are not significant at the ten percent level which suggests 
that these variables had little influence on monetary policy during this 
period. The only significant objective of policy is unemployment, but 
even this coefficient is only significant at the ten percent level. 
Other forms of the reaction function utilizing personal income as a proxy 
for output and the consumer price index as the price objective produced 
similar results. 
The Volcker years, September 1979-April 1984 
Table 4.4 presents the results of ordinary least squares and probit 
estimates of the reaction function for the Volcker years. The F-ratio 
2  . . .  2  
and X value are significant at the one percent level and the R is 
noticeably larger than those reported for the other two subperiods. The 
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Table 4.4. Results of the Volcker years, I979(9)-1984(4) 
Probability model 
Independent Beta Estimated Estimated 
variable coefficient coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept - 0.45104 - -0.33082 -
IP -0.24292 -13.806 -1.493 -37.729 -0.857 
PPI -0.26530 -30.673*** -2.554 -105.06** -2.021 
Û 0.43327 1.4267*** 2.728 6.6244*** 2.445 
BT 0.054331 0.054590 0.510 -0.025379 -0.052 
®n = 56, R^ = .46, F = 10.883***. 
^n = 56, log likelihood = -20.514, chi-square = 30.716***. 
results suggest that the policy adoption decision was highly influenced 
by the policy objectives in the reaction function. All slope coeffi­
cients carry the expected sign and the coefficients of unemployment and 
the producer price index are significant at the five percent level or 
better. Most surprisingly, the beta coefficients imply that the Fed was 
most concerned with unemployment and to a lesser extent prices.^ 
Although the coefficient of the industrial production index is not 
significant, the size of the beta coefficient suggests that growth in 
output may have influenced the policy adoption decision. In accordance 
with the results of most studies of Federal Reserve behavior, the balance 
^This result may in part be due to the form of the data. U is in 
the form of a change in the unemployment rate, not the level of unemploy­
ment . 
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of trade appears to have had little or no impact on monetary policy 
decis ions. 
Summary of subperiod results classified by chairmen 
The purpose of this portion of the study was twofold. First, an 
attempt was made to discover whether or not forecasts of the stated 
objectives of monetary policy influence the Fed's policy adoption 
decisions. Second, an attempt was made to determine the priorities of 
monetary policy during the Martin, Burns, and Volcker chairmanships. 
The results suggest that the Fed did react to the hypothesized goals 
of policy in two of the three subperiods tested. However, during the 
Burns era (1970—1977), it has not been demonstrated that the Fed had a 
definable reaction function. For this period, no form of the model 
2 
tested had a significant F-ratio or X value. In contrast, policy 
intentions were strongly influenced by both unemployment and inflation 
during the years when Martin and Volcker were at Che helm of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
In a sharp criticism of the strategy and tactics of the Federal 
Reserve, Milton Friedman stated, "Information about the name of the 
chairman of the Federal Reserve is of little or no use in describing the 
behavior of the Fed ..." [15, p. 103]. The reaction functions presented 
here suggest that the name of the chairman of the Fed may, in fact, be 
useful in describing the behavior of the Fed. 
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A Test of Federal Reserve Independence 
From the Presidential Election Cycle 
There are many studies which test the hypothesis that the proximity 
of a presidential election systematically causes the Federal Reserve to 
adopt an easier monetary policy. Stated in terms of the objectives of 
monetary policy, preelection political pressure may cause the Fed to be 
concerned with growth and unemployment, while postelection freedom may 
allow the Fed to fight inflation. If it is true that incumbent 
presidents manipulate monetary policy for partisan political objectives, 
the implications for discretionary monetary policy are severe.^ 
An alternative hypothesis, which if sustained is equally disturbing, 
has not been tested in the literature. This hypothesis is that the 
Federal Reserve, possibly in an attempt to avoid influencing the outcome 
of presidential elections, fails to respond to changes in economic 
conditions in the preelection periods with the same enthusiasm as it does 
in the postelection periods. Under this hypothesis, the Federal Reserve 
would pursue such a noninterventionist policy prior to elections that it 
may fail to react to the objectives of monetary policy in a manner 
prescribed by economic theory. However, in the postelection periods, the 
Fed would be free to pursue an active monetary policy in a manner 
consistent with economic theory. 
There is clearly a distinction between these hypotheses. In the 
first, monetary policy is influenced directly by partisan politics. In 
^The results of studies testing this hypothesis are mixed. While 
Tufte [45] and Laney and Willett [27] find evidence of partisan political 
influence on monetary policy, Luckett and Potts [29] and Wallace and 
Warner [49] do not. 
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the second, monetary policy is influenced indirectly by the election 
cycle in a nonpartisan manner. However, both of the hypotheses presented 
have one important similarity. In both scenarios, monetary policy is 
systematically different in preelection periods versus postelection 
periods. This systematic policy switching, if it exists, may create what 
has been termed "the political business cycle." 
Previous studies of the political business cycle have often omitted 
evidence of cycles induced by monetary policy and instead centered on 
cycles induced by fiscal policy. However, Tufte [45] has asserted the 
existence of a political business cycle caused by monetary policy by 
producing evidence that monetary aggregates grow faster in the preelec­
tion biennia than the postelection biennia. This in itself actually 
provides little insight into the political independence of the Fed since 
later studies have shown that the growth rates of monetary aggregates 
tend to increase prior to elections because fiscal deficits grow during 
these same periods [27, p. 70]. Thus, the Fed may simply be passively 
monetizing a political fiscal cycle. For this reason, tests of these 
hypotheses that use monetary aggregates as the indicator of monetary 
policy will tend to confuse the source of the alleged political business 
cycle. 
In light of the prior discussion, the reaction function previously 
developed in this chapter is particularly well suited to test these 
hypotheses. It directly relates monetary policy intentions to policy 
objectives. This reaction function then avoids the problems associated 
with decomposing the policy indicator into actual and intended policy. 
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This decomposition must be done with monetary aggregate or money market 
indicators [27, p. 70j. 
To test the more general hypothesis that the Federal Reserve's 
preelection reaction function differs from its postelection reaction 
function, equation 4.1 was estimated over the two subperiods which 
correspond to the preelection biennia and the postelection biennia. 
Equation 4.1 is reproduced below for convenience: 
= =0 + Cl^Pt + + C3%c + =4%?; ^  S (4.1) 
where all variables are as defined on page 41. The tiraespan for this 
test is again 1953(2) through 1984(4) and the year base for the 
subperiods is November through October. 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the ordinary least squares and 
probit estimates of the reaction function for the preelection biennia. 
2 
The F-ratio and % value are significant at the one percent level. All 
of the coefficients carry the expected sign except the balance of trade. 
However, only the coefficient on unemployment is significant, and then 
only at the ten percent level. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the ordinary least squares and 
probit estimates of the reaction function for the postelection biennia. 
2 
The F-ratio and x value are highly significant. All slope coefficients 
enter with the expected sign. The coefficients of both the producer 
price index and unemployment are significant at the one percent level. 
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Table 4.5. Results of preelection biennia, 1953(2)-198A(4) 
Probability model 
Linear® Probit^ 
Independent Beta Estimated Estimated 
variable coefficient coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-: ratio 
Intercept - 0.45923 - -0.10113 -
IP -0.058307 -3.6433 -0.503 -11.116 -0 .563 
PPI -0.0018521 -0.25948 -0.025 1.5546 0 .057 
Û 0.20462 0.66598* 1.779 1.7926* 1 .774 
BT -0.068753 -0.10542 -0.947 -0.30109 -1 .004 
= 186, R^ = .07, F = 3.500***. 
^n = 186, log likelihood = -120.83, chi-square = 14.043***. 
Table 4.6. Results of postelection biennia, 1953(2)-1984(4) 
Probability model 
Linear^ Probit^ 
Independent Beta Estimated Estimated 
variable coefficient coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept - 0.56051 - 0.20589 -
IP -0.067516 -5.6750 -0, .709 -18.817 -0. 776 
PPI -0.22443 -27.229*** -3. 308 -80.166*** -3. 295 
Û 0.27009 0.99516*** 2, .812 3.0026*** 2. ,769 
BT 0.064346 0.086915 0, .956 0.25287 0. 951 
^n = 189, = .18, F = 10.004***. 
= 189, log likelihood = -112.74, chi-square = 37.586***. 
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A visual inspection of these tables suggests that there is a 
2 . 2 
considerable difference in these two periods. The R , F-ratio, and % 
value are all much larger in the postelection periods. This implies that 
a greater percentage of the variance in the policy indicator was 
explained by the forecast objectives in the postelection periods when 
compared with the preelection periods. Also, the individual coefficients 
generated in the postelection periods have higher t-ratios than their 
counterparts in the preelection periods. 
The difference in these two subperiods is so pronounced that tests 
of structural change of the slope vectors were performed on the reaction 
functions. The results of the structural change tests for the linear and 
probit reaction functions imply the following: the hypothesis that the 
slope coefficients for the pre- and postelection periods are the same is 
rejected at the 25 percent and ten percent levels, respectively.^ 
^The test of structural change in the linear probability model is: 
(SSE_ - SSE )/(k-l) , . 
F = F 
SSEy/(n-2k) n-2k 
where k = number of parameters in the restricted model, and 
n = number of observations in the restricted model. 
„ (83.206 - 81.6A5)/4 _ , „ 
^ 81.645/365 
which is significant at the 25 percent level. 
The test for structural change in the probit probability model is: 
x' -  -  <h * V ~ 'q 
where = value of the log likelihood for the restricted model, 
Lj, 1-2 ~ value of the log likelihood for the unrestricted models, and 
q = the number of restrictions. 
= -2[-237.74 - (-120.83 - 112.74)] = 8.34 
which is significant at the ten percent level. 
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Although these results are not definitive, they do suggest that the Fed 
systematically reacts differently to changes in economic conditions in 
preelection versus postelection periods.^ 
To carry the analysis one step further, it should be determined 
which, if either, of the original hypotheses is evidenced by these 
results. That is, do the differences that appear in the pre- and 
postelection results suggest that they were caused by direct partisan 
influence or preelection self-restraint on the part of the Fed? 
Since the inflation objective gains importance in the postelection 
period, one might be tempted to assert that partisan politics are the 
cause. However, the unemployment objective also gains importance in the 
postelection period when compared with the preelection period. This is 
clearly not the result one would expect if the Fed were dominated by 
partisan political pressures. 
For whatever reason, it appears the Fed has simply failed to react 
to the objectives of policy in the preelection periods with the same zeal 
as it has in the postelection periods. This may be an attempt by the Fed 
to avoid any undue influence on an upcoming presidential election, or it 
may be the result of a central bank that is intimidated by a political 
system from which it is trying to maintain its independence. 
^Although other forms of the reaction functions using personal 
income and the consumer price index produced similar regression results, 
the tests of structural change were sensitive to the form chosen. The 
form of the reaction function reported here shows the greatest change in 
structure. In addition, reaction functions based on actual instead of 
forecast data did not show as large a structure change. 
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The results presented here suggest that the Federal Reserve's policy-
response to forecasts of the objectives of monetary policy is different 
during the pre- versus postelection biennia. However, an analysis of the 
reasons why this is the case is a subjective task. 
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CHAPTER V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN OPERATING 
STRATEGY ON THE PRIORITIES OF MONETARY POLICY 
On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve announced a series of 
actions intended to reduce inflationary momentum and inflationary 
expectations. The action that has gained the greatest notice was "A 
change in the method used to conduct monetary policy ... [which] involves 
placing greater emphasis in day-to-day operation on the supply of bank 
reserves and less emphasis on confining short-term fluctuations in the 
federal funds rate" [13, October 1979, p. 830]. This action has been 
interpreted by economists as a fundamental change in the operating 
strategy of the Fed. 
It is apparent that the outcome of monetary policy has changed since 
the Fed moved from a money market strategy to a monetary aggregate 
strategy. The growth rates of monetary aggregates have been slower and 
the variability of interest rates has been greater. The economy first 
reflected the impact of this strategy change with rising unemployment, 
negative growth, and a reduction in the rate of inflation. The economy 
has since rebounded with falling unemployment, modest growth, and 
relatively stable prices. 
Although the results of monetary policy before the change in 
strategy clearly differ from the results after the change in strategy, 
the objectives and priorities of monetary policy may have remained the 
same. That is, it is quite possible that the Fed is simply better able 
to gain results with the new operating strategy than with the old 
operating strategy, while the intentions of policy have remained 
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unchanged. Alternatively, a new priority system may have been ushered in 
along with the change in operating procedure. This would suggest that 
the change in the outcome of monetary policy may not be due solely to the 
change in strategy, but due to a change in priorities as well. 
To test the hypothesis that the objectives and priorities of 
monetary policy changed in October 1979, a reaction function similar to 
that developed in Chapter IV will be employed. However, there are some 
differences in the method used to forecast the objectives of policy. 
Recall that the forecasts used in Chapter IV were the predicted 
values from a fixed-coefficient VAR model. This forecasting method can 
be criticized because information was used to generate the forecasts that 
was not available to the monetary authorities at the time they made their 
forecasts. To avoid this problem, a VAR model of the form of equation 
3.6 (p. 36) was reestimated each month of the sample period using only 
the preceding 60 months of data (60 months of data prior to the relevant 
FOMC policy adoption decision). Each monthly estimation was used to 
forecast the target variables for one month of the sample period. Thus, 
the forecasting coefficients are allowed to vary from month to month 
based on the past 60 months of information. By utilizing a variable-
coefficient VAR model on past data, the forecasts of the target variables 
are true forecasts. 
The data used in the forecasting equations are monthly values of 
personal income, the industrial production index, the consumer price 
index, the producer price index, the unemployment rate, the balance of 
trade surplus, the Ml money supply, the three-month Treasury bill rate, 
Che dollar/G-lO exchange rate, and the fiscal surplus. To assure 
stationarity, all data series were first differenced. The transformed 
data were utilized in a third-order variable-coefficient VAR model of the 
2 
form of equation 3.6 (p. 33). The forecasts generated from this model 
will be denoted ( ). 
Table 5.1 shows the correlation between the forecast value and the 
actual value of the target variables. Again, this does not provide 
Table 5.1. Correlation between actual and predicted values of the target 
variables generated from a variable-coefficient VAR model: 
1974(1)-1984(5) 
Target variable Correlation 
1. Personal income (PI) .86 
2. Industrial production index (IP) .93 
3. Producer price index (PPI) .83 
4. Consumer price index (CPI) .92 
5. Unemployment (Û) .88 
6. Balance of trade (BT) .93 
7. Exchange rate (ER) .85 
^The dollar/G-lO exchange rate, the fiscal surplus, and the balance 
of trade were obtained from various issues of the Federal Reserve 
Builetin. The doHar/G-10 exchange rate is a trade weighted exchange 
rate of the dollar versus the currencies of ten industrialized trading 
partners. 
2 No test was performed for the optimal number of lags because no 
system log likelihood test exists for repeated estimation of a VAR model. 
Therefore, the choice of three lags on each of ten variables in the VAR 
model was somewhat arbitrary. Since only 60 months of data were 
available for each estimation, it was felt that no more than 30 slope 
coefficients should be estimated. Also, first differenced data were used 
because these transformed data were stationary within any 60-month 
period. 
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information about how closely these forecasts correlate with the Fed's 
actual forecasts, because the Fed's actual forecasts cannot be obtained. 
The target variables can be placed into the four categories of the 
objectives of monetary policy: 
A  A 
1) growth in output—PI or IP, 
2) price stability—PPI or CPI, 
3) unemployment—U, and 
4) international balance—BT or ER. 
Two output, two price, and two international variables can be combined 
into eight combinations. For this reason, eight forms of the reaction 
function were estimated. However, to avoid the reporting of redundant 
results, only one form is reported in this chapter. It is of the 
following structure: 
= <0 * * 'zCPI, . d]», * \ ".u 
where P = policy indicator, 0 = tight money, 1 = easy money; 
IP = forecast value of the change in the industrial production 
index; 
CPI = forecast value of the change in the consumer price index; 
U = forecast value of the change in the unemployment percentage; 
BT = forecast value of the change in the balance of trade surplus; 
6 = error term. 
Because the industrial production index is a real variable, it was again 
used as the proxy for growth. The choice of an inflation proxy and an 
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international balance proxy was somewhat arbitrary because the results 
were not sensitive to these choices. 
To test the hypothesis that the objectives and priorities of 
monetary policy changed in October 1979, equation 5.1 was estimated as a 
linear probability model and as a probit probability model for the two 
subperiods of January 1974 through September 1979 and October 1979 
through May 1984. 
Table 5.2 presents the results of ordinary least squares and probit 
estimates of the reaction function for the subperiod of January 1974 
2 
through September 1979. Neither the F-ratio nor the X value are 
significant at the ten percent level, therefore the hypothesis that all 
slope coefficients equal zero cannot be rejected. In addition, the small 
2 R suggests that very little of the variance in the policy indicator is 
explained by the forecasts of the objectives of policy. All coefficients 
enter with the expected sign except the coefficient of the balance of 
trade. However, only the coefficient of the consumer price index is 
significant at the ten percent level. 
Table 5.3 presents the ordinary least squares and probit estimates 
of the reaction function for the subperiod of October 1979 through May 
2 
1984. The F-ratio and X value are highly significant, which suggests 
that the policy-adoption decisions were heavily influenced by the 
forecasts of the policy objectives. The coefficients of the industrial 
production index, consumer price index, and unemployment are all highly 
significant and carry the expected signs. The coefficient of the balance 
of trade surplus entered with the expected sign, but this coefficient was 
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Table 5.2. Results of the 1974(1)-1979(9) subperiod 
Probability model 
Linear^ Probit^ 
Independent Beta Estimated Estimated 
variable coefficient coefficient^ t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept - 0.83712 - 0.89901 -
IP -0.041339 -0.016691 -0.254 -0.057136 -0.322 
CPI -0.22212 -0.21410* -1.821 -0.56858* -1.835 
Û 0.11248 0.27952 0.691 0.82206 0.750 
-6 -5 
BT -0.0090346 -7.7829"10 -0.074 -1.5623*10 -0.057 
69 , R^ = .06, F = 1.072. 
= 69 , log likelihood = -44.336, chi-square = 4.519. 
and *** appearing in Tables 5.2 and 5. .3 indicate signifi-
cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, t-tests are two-
tailed while F and x tests are one-tailed. 
Table 5.3. Results of the 1979(10)-1984(5) subperiod 
Probability model 
Linear^ Probit .b 
Independent Beta Estimated Estimated 
variable coefficient coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept - 0.62021 - 0.49617 -
IP -0.43780 -0.13239*** -3.250 -0.56820** -2 .621 
CPI -0.34171 -0.16545*** -3.537 -0.65252** -2 .633 
U 0.28952 0.71681** 2.147 3.4899* 1 00
 
00
 
BT 0.064106 1.9799*10"^ 0.665 8.0776*10"^ 0 .523 
= 56, = .53, F = 14.409***. 
= 56, log likelihood = -17.655, chi-square = 36.433***. 
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not significant. The beta coefficients suggest that growth in output 
received the highest priority, followed by stable prices and 
unemployment.^ 
Since a visual inspection of Tables 5.2 and 5.3 suggests that these 
two periods are characterized by different priorities, a test of struc­
tural change was performed on the reaction functions. The results of the 
structural change tests for the linear and probit reaction functions 
imply the following: the hypothesis that the slope coefficients for the 
subperiods of 1974(1)-1979(9) and 1979(10)-1984(5) are the same is 
2 
rejected at the ten and one percent levels, respectively. Although 
The results presented in Table 5.3 differ somewhat from those 
generated for a similar subperiod reported in Table 4.4. This may be due 
to several factors. First, the reaction function presented in this 
chapter utilized the CPI for the price stability objective, while the 
reaction function in the preceding chapter utilized the PPI. If the 
correlation of the CPI and IP is less than the correlation of the PPI and 
IP, reaction functions fitted with the CPI may allow the significance of 
IP to rise. Second, the form of the data differs between these two 
reaction functions: growth rates versus first differences of the levels. 
Third, the methods of data generation differ: fixed-coefficient VAR 
versus variable-coefficient VAR. 
^The test of structural change in the linear probability model is: 
(SSE^ - SSEy)/(k-l) 
^ SSEy/(n-2k) ^n-2k 
where all variables are as defined on page 52. 
„ _ (23.100 - 21.486)/4 _ _ 
21.486/115 
which is significant at the ten percent level. 
The test for structural change in the probit probability model is: 
- (h - t;)] -
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these results are not definitive, it does appear that the priorities of 
monetary policy did change when the new operating procedures were 
announced. 
The results suggest that the Fed may have suffered from a lack of 
direction or purpose during the middle and late 1970s. This is evidenced 
by the fact that no form of the reaction function tested over the 1974(1) 
2 
through 1979(9) subperiod had a significant F-ratio or x value. 
However, after the announcement of the new operating procedures, there 
appears to exist a definite set of priorities used by the monetary 
authorities. This is demonstrated by all of the supporting statistics to 
the 1979(10) through 1984(5) subperiod reaction function. 
It should be noted that a singular source of the change in 
priorities of monetary policy cannot be determined from the preceding 
test. Two nearly concomitant events took place in 1979: the appointment 
of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Board of Governors, and two months 
later the announcement that the Fed would begin targeting monetary 
aggregates. It is reasonable that these two events should be viewed as 
one. That is, the appointment of Volcker as chairman and the methods he 
espoused may be inseparable. If this view is accepted, the choice of 
September/October 1979 as the breaking point of the reaction function 
where all variables are as defined on page 52. 
y} = -2[-69.604 - (-44.336 - 17.655)] = 15.226 
which is significant at the one percent level. 
^All forms of the reaction function tested showed structural change 
at the ten percent level or better. 
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becomes somewhat arbtirary. However, there is little doubt that these 
events have marked the beginning of a period where the objectives and 
priorities of the monetary authorities are well defined. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY OF THE FORECASTING METHODS 
This study utilized two methods of data generation: a fixed-
coefficient VAR model and a variable-coefficient VAR model. Tables 4.1 
and 5.1 express the correlations between the actual and predicted values 
of the data generated from these two models. Clearly, the variable-
coefficient VAR model performed better than the fixed-coefficient VAR 
model. There are three reasons why chis is the case. First, the fixed-
coefficient VAR model utilized data that were filtered to a greater 
degree (i.e., the transformations for stationarity were more severe). 
This results in a data series with no trend. Furthermore, the 
correlations in Table 4.1 are based on the transformed data. If the data 
had been coverted back into levels, the correlations would appear much 
higher. Second, the variable-coefficient VAR model contained two 
variables that were unavailable for the full sample period: the fiscal 
surplus, and the dollar/G-10 exchange rate. These variables may have 
added to the accuracy of the variable-coefficient VAR model. Third, the 
true relationships between the variables in the vector may not be time 
invariant, which would suggest that the variable-coefficient VAR model 
should perform better than the fixed-coefficient VAR model. 
Although it would have been desirable to use a variable-coefficient 
VAR model to create all of the forecasts, the costs associated with this 
method of data generation were prohibitive. Therefore, the variable-
coefficient VAR model was only used for the 1974-1984 subperiod. 
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